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- Review the state of the art techniques in the field of phishing email detection techniques.
- Review methods for evaluating quality of phishing email detection.
- Consider how the Named Entity Recognition techniques may be used for this task.
- Select a method for classification and implement it as a baseline.
- Measure the performance of the baseline algorithm on publicly available datasets and the Email.cz dataset.
- Modify the selected method to get better results.
- Evaluate the experiments and summarize the results.
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Abstrakt
Phishing je va´zˇny´ proble´m, ktery´ zp˚usobuje nezanedbatelne´ financˇn´ı ztra´ty
mnoha organizac´ım po cele´m sveˇteˇ. Soucˇasne´ metody pro detekci phishingu
pro cˇesky´ jazyk jsou nedostatecˇne´. Rozpozna´van´ı entit (NER) bylo u´speˇsˇneˇ
pouzˇito pro detekci phishing email˚u v anglicke´m i jiny´ch jazyc´ıch.
C´ılem te´to pra´ce je pouzˇ´ıt NER pro urcˇen´ı c´ıle potencia´ln´ıho phishing
emailu a pouzˇ´ıt tuto informaci k detekci phishingu.
Vyvinuli jsme resˇen´ı schopne´ detekovat c´ıl potencia´ln´ıho phishing emailu.
Nasˇe rˇesˇen´ı funguje dobrˇe pro vy´znamne´ phishing c´ıle jako trˇeba financˇn´ı
a technicke´ spolecˇnosti. Doka´zali jsme, zˇe detekce phishing c´ıle je zdrojem
cenny´ch informac´ı o phishing emailu a mu˚zˇe by´t pouzˇita pro detekci phishingu.
Na´sˇe rˇesˇen´ı pro rozpozna´n´ı phishingu dosa´hlo 86.9% u´speˇsˇnosti prˇi pouzˇit´ı
pouze jedne´ vlastnosti vygenerovane´ pomoc´ı detekce phishing c´ıle. Prˇi pouzˇit´ı
bezˇneˇ pouzˇ´ıvany´ch vlastnost´ı nasˇe rˇesˇen´ı dosa´hlo 97.7% u´speˇsˇnosti. Prˇida´n´ı
vlastnost´ı zalozˇeny´ch na detekci phishing c´ıle zp˚usobilo male´ zlepsˇen´ı. Resˇen´ı
dosa´hlo 98% u´speˇsˇnosti.
Pro rozpozna´va´n´ı entit jsme pouzˇili Nametag, soucˇasneˇ neprˇekonany´ NER
pro cˇesky´ jazyk. Natre´novali jsme vlastn´ı modely pro Nametag, pouzˇili jsme
p˚uvodn´ı a vlastn´ı prˇidana´ data. NER jsme pouzˇili pro rozpozna´n´ı entit
v emailu. Pouzˇili jsme vlastn´ı rˇesˇen´ı pro mapova´n´ı jmen organizac´ı na dome´ny
pomoc´ı dat z ARES a Firmy.cz. Namapovane´ dome´ny jsme pouzˇili pro urcˇen´ı
c´ıle potencia´ln´ıho phishing u´toku.
Model pro Nametag byl otestova´n proti dat˚um pro u´kol z CoNLL2003
zaby´vaj´ıc´ı se rozpozna´va´n´ım entit. Detekce phishing c´ıle byla otestova´na
pomoc´ı 2628 email˚u z dat od Email.cz. Nakonec jsme nasˇe rˇesˇen´ı pro detekci
phishingu otestovali pomoc´ı datasetu obsahuj´ıc´ıho 3744 email˚u z verˇejny´ch i
neverˇejny´ch zdroj˚u.
Kl´ıcˇova´ slova Phishing, strojove´ ucˇen´ı, email, rozpoznava´n´ı entit, Cˇesky´
jazyk
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Abstract
Phishing is a serious problem that causes a significant financial loss to many
companies wolrdwide. Current phishing detection methods for Czech language
are not satisfactory. Named entity recognition (NER) was successfully used
for phishing email detection in English and other languages.
The goal of this thesis is to use NER to determine target of the potential
phishing email and use this information to detect phishing emails. We have
developed a solution that can detect target of the potential phishing email.
Our solution works well for major phishing targets such as financial and tech-
nology organizations. We have proved that target detection gives a significant
amount of information about the email and can be used to detect phishing.
Our recognizer achieved 86.9% accuracy when using only one feature gen-
erated using target detection. When using only commonly used features the
recognizer achieved 97.7% accuracy. Adding target based features gave us
minor improvement and achieved 98% accuracy.
For Named entity recognition we use Nametag, the state of the art NER
for Czech language. We have trained our own models for Nametag using both
original and custom data. NER is used to recognize organizations in email.
Custom solution is used to map organizations to domains using data from
ARES and Firmy.cz. Mapped domains are used to determine target of the
potential phishing email. Target and collected historical data about domains is
used to generate features for random forest classifier. Random forest classifier
is used to detect whether or not the email is phishing attack.
Nametag model was tested against CoNLL2003 shared task on Named
entity recognition. Target detection solution was tested using 2628 emails
from Email.cz data. Finally the phishing detection recognizer was tested using
dataset containing 3744 emails from both public and private sources.
Keywords Phishing, machine learning, email, Named entity recognition,
Czech language
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Introduction
Phishing is a fraudulent technique with the intention of obtaining confidential
user data. Attackers usually create a similar looking website to a legitimate
one. Therefore uneducated users may have trouble spotting the difference
and can type their credentials into form on malicious website thinking they
are dealing with a legitimate one. In such case attacker gains access to their
sensitive data such as login information or credit card credentials. Attackers
send hypertext links leading to their malicious website using email.
Emails containing such links are called phishing emails. Phishing emails
are hard to detect because they have varying form and content [49]. Attackers
are using various techniques such as obfuscation and tokenization to fight
phishing detection. [49]. Phishing emails are not usually sent in such volumes
as spam. Therefore traditional anti-spam solutions perform poorly at phishing
email detection. Various groups of people has successfully managed to use
machine learning for phishing email detection.
The goal of this thesis is to research possibilities of using Named entity
recognition combined with machine learning and develop filter capable of de-
tecting phishing emails using machine learning approach.
Motivation
There has been over 90 thousand phishing attacks reported just in the Decem-
ber 2016. [29] Phishing emails have caused huge financial loss to various com-
panies worldwide. [13]
Detection of phishing email is an uneasy task that cannot be entirely solved
using conventional programming methods [29]. Many groups of people tried
to solve the problem using machine learning with varying results [30] [28] [26]
[41].
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Goal
The goal of this thesis is to develop a phishing detection solution that is based
on Named entity recognition and proves that Named entity recognition can be
used to gain a significant amount of information about the potential phishing
email.
First we need to research state of the art Named entity recognition and
phishing detection solutions. Then we have to choose Named entity recogni-
tion solution that is most fit for our purpose. We will use the chosen solution
to extract information from the emails and generate features for phishing email
detection.
Next step is to develop baseline phishing email detection solution based
on previous research and evaluate the performance of this solution. Then use
features generated using Named entity recognition as features for developed
phishing email detection solution.
Compare the performance of baseline solution and solution with added
features. Describe the benefits of using features generated using Named entity
recognition.
Evaluate and summarize both the process of research an development and
the achieved results. Describe the most important accomplishments of this
thesis and suggest possible improvements for future work.
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Chapter 1
State-of-the-art
1.1 Phishing email types
Phishing has varying form because attackers are trying to disguise phishing
emails so it does not get detected by phishing and spam detectors. This section
will give a quick overview of different types of phishing emails.
1.1.1 Link-based
Link-based phishing emails are one of the most common forms of phishing.
Attackers put hypertext link leading to malicious website into the email. This
type of phishing email will be main focus of this thesis.
1.1.2 Text-based
Text-based phishing emails are such emails where attackers put forms re-
questing sensitive user data directly into email itself, effectively getting rid
of hypertext link which may help the phishing email go undetected. They
usually create the form using either HTML form tags [8] or just plain text.
We will detect text-based phishing emails in this thesis.
1.1.3 Image-based
Image-based phishing emails are a result of attackers effort to obfuscate the
content of their phishing emails with the aim of making it more difficult to de-
tect their attacks. Such emails use images instead of HTML or text. Attackers
create an image containing text making it harder for spam filters to discover
the content of the email because image processing and on screen character
recognition are complicated tasks. Which makes it hard to detect whether
email is phishing or not. Such phishing emails are relatively rare and their
detection will not be focus of this work.
3
1. State-of-the-art
1.1.4 Attachment-based
Attachment-based phishing mail takes advantage of email attachments and
their diverse formats. Email attachment represents another layer of protection
from phishing detection. Many possible formats attachment and complexity
of used attachment format makes detection more difficult. We will not focus
on detection of this type of phishing email.
1.2 Phishing detection approaches
Phishing emails evolve and change with time. Because of attackers changing
the phishing emails they are sending, and colossal financial loss caused by
phishing, need for more advanced phishing detection techniques is raising.
Scientists have been working on different phishing detection methods. Variety
of ways how to detect phishing emails has been developed. This section will
list and explain some of approaches used for phishing email detection. Most
common phishing detection approaches can be divided into two groups.
1.2.1 Blacklist-based
Generally blacklist is a list of entities, people or other subjects that are con-
sidered untrustworthy. Blacklist-based methods use database of known phish-
ing domains, links or email addresses and check potential phishing emails
against the database. The main weakness of blacklist-based phishing detec-
tion is the blacklist itself. You need to keep blacklist up to date or it becomes
worthless and even if we keep the blacklist updated we will never be able to
detect zero-day phishing emails. Unfortunately domains used for phishing are
often relatively new or hacked legitimate ones [25] which lowers recall 1.6.2 of
blacklist based methods. Blacklisting has high precision 1.6.1 because legit-
imate websites are unlikely to get into the blacklist. In conclusion blacklisting
is simple phishing detection method with high precision but low recall.
1.2.2 Machine learning approach
Machine learning methods use phishing and non-phishing emails to create
a classifier for phishing email detection. As well as blacklist-based approach
machine learning approach has certain drawbacks. The process of training the
classifier is time-intensive and requires the dataset containing both phishing
and non-phishing emails. The dataset greatly influences the performance of
classifier. Also the implementation of machine learning algorithms is far more
complicated than implementation of blacklist-based methods.
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1.3 Phishtank
One example of black-list based solution is Phishtank. Phishtank is a com-
munity website that gathers information about confirmed phishing attacks.
The information about attacks is publicly available and can be downloaded in
many formats. Anyone can sign up and either submit new phishing attacks
or verify existing ones. Furthermore Phishtank offers a free API for both
non-commercial and commercial use. [14]
1.4 Machine learning
Machine learning is a subfield of computer science that gives computers ability
to learn without being explicitly programmed. [33] Rather than describing the
whole subject of machine learning in detail, this section will briefly describe
essential parts of machine learning related of thesis to phishing email detection.
Machine learning tasks are usually classified into three general categories.
1.4.1 Supervised learning
Supervised learning maps input data to desired output. It is trained using
annotated data. Supervised learning the main focus of this thesis. Common
tasks include classification tasks such as Computer vision, Speech recognition,
Optical character recognition, Information retrieval, Document classification
and Phishing email detection.
1.4.2 Unsupervised learning
Unsupervised learning annotates or finds structure in data. No training and
no annotated training data is required. Some minor parts of this thesis will
focus on this category. Unsupervised learning includes certain NLP tasks such
as word embeddings [23] and Brown clustering.
1.4.3 Reinforcement learning
Reinforcement learning is very different from the two previous categories. It
involves a computer interacting with dynamic environment. There is no an-
notated training data. Instead of training data the system is learning trough
reward and punishment. This category includes task such as vehicle driving.
1.5 Datasets
Datasets are collections of data. Datasets are crucial part of all machine
learning methods used for phishing email detection. Training dataset has
huge impact on performance of the resulting phishing email detector. Ideally
5
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the dataset should match the real life data otherwise the resulting model may
perform poorly when used with real life data despite the fact that it performs
well on held-out data from the dataset.
1.5.1 SpamAssassin
SpamAssassin [20] is a high performing [30] open source spam detection plat-
form. Spam assassin project has gathered a huge amount of emails.
SpamAssassin email corpus is one of most commonly used publicly avail-
able datasets for English language [21]. SpamAssassin email corpus consists
of both spam and ham messages. Messages were either collected from publicly
available sources or sent to author of corpus with permission for public use.
SpamAssassin email corpus has been used in many works focused on phishing
email detection [48] [30] [44]
1.5.2 Email.cz dataset
Thanks to Email.cz we have access to moderate dataset of emails. Dataset
includes both phishing and non-phishing emails from various sources. There
is 5472 phishing and about 10 thousand non-phishing emails in the dataset.
Phishing emails come from three different sources. First part is a public
dataset that was downloaded from [10] 1 Second part consists of phishing
emails reported by Email.cz users. Last little part was obtained from hoax.cz.
Non-phishing emails is a sample of emails collected from traffic.
To our knowledge there are no publicly available phishing datasets for
Czech language. All Czech emails used in this thesis were taken from Email.cz
dataset.
1.6 Evaluation methods
Evaluation methods are used for establishing how accurately does given ma-
chine learning system perform. When looking at two independent systems we
need a well-defined measure that will allow us to compare them.
1.6.1 Precision
Precision represents how many of tagged samples are relevant. Concerning
phishing email detection precision is really important because low precision
means that a lot of legitimate emails are being tagged as phishing. Precision
only measures the quality of the system not the quantity therefore it can’t be
used for comparison of two systems by itself.
1Unfortunatelly the link is not working anymore. We do not know if or where it can be
downloaded now.
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1.6.2 Recall
Recall represents how many of relevant samples were tagged. Concerning
phishing email detection low recall means that a lot of phishing emails are not
detected. Recall only measures quantity of the system not the quality that’s
why it can’t be used for serious comparison of two systems by itself.
1.6.3 F-measure
F-measure is a combined measure that incorporates precision and recall. It can
be used for measuring performance and comparing machine learning systems.
F-measure is defined as a harmonic mean of precision and recall.
F measure = 2 · precision · recall
precision + recall
1.7 Machine learning in phishing detection
This section will give a brief overview of chosen machine learning methods
that has been already successfully used for phishing email detection in previous
works. Tolan at el. [48] has compared a performance of variety of ML methods
when used for phishing email detection.
1.7.1 Linear regression
Linear regression is one of the simplest machine learning methods. It uses
simple mathematical functions with precisely tuned parameters to model the
phenomenon. Input of the function are decimal numbers representing chosen
features of tested email. Output of the function is one decimal number that
is used to determine whether the tested email is phishing or not.
According to [24] Linear regression has the best results out of all compared
methods.
1.7.2 Support vector machine
Support vector machine (SVM) is one of the most commonly used machine
learning method for phishing detection. The principle behind this method is
following. Each email is converted to vector in multi dimensional space. The
goal is to find a hyperplane that separates phishing and non-phishing emails.
Support vector machines has been successfully used to detect phishing
emails by many researchers including [28], [26], [38] and [48].
1.7.3 Decision trees and Random forest
Decision trees learning are a simple machine learning method. Feature vector
extracted from the email travels from the root to the leaves of the tree. The
7
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path trough the tree is determined by conditions in the nodes of the tree.
Result is assigned to each leaf.
Random forest is a collection of decision trees. Each tree classifies the
email independently and the final result is determined by the voting system.
Decision trees are prone to overfitting the dataset. Random forest should
prevent overfitting by training each of the trees with randomly selected of
features. Random forests were successfully used in [30] and [37].
1.7.4 Neural networks
Neural networks are popular machine learning method commonly used for
various tasks. This method is inspired by actual neural networks. Neural net-
works consist of neurons that send and accept signals from one another. Bonds
between the neurons have different weight. Neurons are usually organized into
layers.
This method is not widely used for phishing email detection. It was suc-
cessfully used alongside with other methods in [24] and [26].
1.8 Features
Generally speaking features are pieces of information extracted from the raw
data presented to recognizer. When considering phishing detection only data
that is guaranteed to be present is the email itself. Websites linked from inside
of the email may not be working or links might not be present at all. Therefore
many features used for phishing detection in state of the art systems rely only
on data available directly from the email itself.
Choosing features carefully is on of the most important tasks when design-
ing any machine learning system [48]. Poor choice of features may drastically
reduce performance of phishing detection recognizer. There are numerous
works that use dozens of features and compare their effect on performance of
phishing email detection system such as [48], [26], [30], [38] and [36].
1.9 Features for phishing email detection
In 2010 Tolan has extracted 40 features from emails from three different data-
sets to determine the features that bring the most valuable information for
spam and phishing email detection. [48] Some features were carefully selected
form previous papers other features were added by author himself. Features
that had brought most significant information gain in all three datasets are
following.
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1.9.1 Body richness
Body richness is defined as the total number of words divided by the number
of characters in the email body. Body richness formula is shown in formula.
Body richness was originally proposed by Chandrasekaran et al. [28] and it
was in the top three most significant features in all three tested datasets in
[48].
bodyRichness = numberOfWords
numberOfCharacters
1.9.2 Subject richness
Subject richness is defined as number of words divided by the number of
characters in the email subject. Subject richness formula is shown in formula.
This feature was one of the top three most significant features in all three
tested datasets in [48].
subjectRichness = numberOfWords
numberOfCharacters
1.9.3 Number of links
This feature represents number of links in the body of the email. It was
previously used in following papers [30] [27]. This feature has been also used
to detect Czech phishing emails in [37].
1.9.4 Number of external links
Number of external links represents number of links in the body of the email
with target outside of the email body. This feature was previously used in
[27].
1.9.5 Number of domains
Number of domains measures total number of domains in all URLs in the
email. This feature was used in [30] and [37].
1.9.6 Number of characters
This feature represents number of characters in the body of the email. It was
used in [28] and [37].
1.9.7 Body HTML
Body HTML is a binary feature that is true when HTML is present in the
email. Previously used in [30] and [37].
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1.9.8 Maximum number of periods
This feature measures maximum number of periods present in a link in the
email. This feature was previously used in [30] [27].
1.9.9 Number of words
Number of words represents total number of words in the body of the email.
Used in [28] and also used in [37] to detect Czech phishing emails.
1.9.10 Advanced features
Some researchers took experimenting with features even further by extracting
advanced features from the email. [44]. Shyni et al. [44] has developed a
successful phishing email detector using features such as Named entity recog-
nition, Topic modeling and Image processing. It is clear that using advanced
features can improve the performance of the phishing email detector.
1.10 Named entity recognition
Named entity recognition (NER) is a data extraction task that belongs into
group of tasks called Natural language processing. The input is unannotated
stream of text and the goal of Named entity recognition is to recognize words or
chunks of words that are proper names (entities), such as people, organizations
and locations. In addition to entities Named entity recognition implementa-
tions sometimes extract other information, such as time, date, hypertext links
and email addresses.
State of the art implementations reach close to human performance with
93.39 F-measure in MUC-7 [9] task and 90.80 F-measure on dataset from
CoNLL-2003 shared task [42] [3].
1.10.1 CoNLL-2003 shared task
Shared task of Conference on Computational Natural Language Learning
in 2003 [2] was focused on language-independent Named entity recognition.
CoNLL-2003 shared task provided contestants with annotated training and
testing data as well as unannotated data and lists of names. One of the chal-
lenges for contestants was to incorporate additional provided data into their
solutions.
CoNLL-2003 shared task dataset contains four entity types: person, or-
ganization, location and misc for entities that do not belong to previous three
categories. Entities are non-embedded, non-overlapping and annotated with
exactly one label. [46] There are data available for English an German lan-
guages. [3]
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Despite being almost 13 years old CoNLL-2003 shared task is still being
used as standard measurement for comparison of Named entity recognition
systems performance. [46] [45] [42] Initial baseline performance for CoNNL-
2003 shared task is 59.61 F-measure. Over dozen of teams have participated in
the shared task. The best result achieved was 88.76 F-measure [31]. Current
state of the art Named entity recognition performance on CoNLL-2003 shared
task is 90.80 F-measure. [42]
1.10.2 Czech Named Entity Corpus
For Czech language the Czech Named Entity Corpus is available. CNEC 2.0
is a large corpus of manually annotated Czech sentences. Corpus contains
46 types of named entities. These fine-grained classes are grouped into 7 su-
pertypes: numbers in addresses, geographic items, institutions, media names,
artifact names, personal names and time expressions. Entities can be labeled
with one or more classes and can be embedded. [4]
Czech Named Entity Corpus was originally released together with a Named
entity recognition system that achieved 62 F-measure on fine-grained classes
and 68 F-measure on supertypes. In 2011 it was outperformed by recognizer
that achieved score of 72.94 F-measure on supertypes. [34] Currently the
best performing named entity recognizer on Czech Named Entity Corpus is
Nametag with 82.82 F-measure. [46]
1.11 Nametag
Nametag is state of the art implementation of Named entity recognition for
Czech language. Nametag also achieved score of 89.16 F-measure on CoNLL-
2003 shared task dataset which is close to performance of the current state of
the art Named entity recognition system for English language.
The recognizer is based on Maximum Entropy Markov Model and a Vi-
terbi [32] algorithm decodes an optimal sequence labeling using probabilities
estimated by a maximum entropy classifier. The classification features utilize
morphological analysis, two-stage prediction, word clustering and gazetteers.
[46]
1.11.1 Overview
Nametag classifier is based on Maximum Entropy Markov Models which are
models derived from Hidden Markov Models and use Maximum entropy prin-
ciple. In couple of following sections we are going to take a closer look at both
Hidden Markov Models and Maximum Entropy Markov Models as well as the
Maximum entropy principle. For decoding Nametag uses custom implement-
ation of Viterbi algorithm. [32]
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Nametag uses standard set of classification features: form, lemma, tag,
chunk (only English) of current word and surrounding words in window of
two words on each side, orthographic features (capitalization, punctuation,
lowercase and uppercase form of the word), suffixes and prefixes of length 4
and regular expressions identifying possible year, date and time (in Czech).
[46]
Nametag also uses global features by repeating the prediction process and
using the prediction from the first run in the second one.
1.11.2 Markov Models
Markov models are statistical models used to predict series of random events.
It is assumed that each event depends only on the current state and not on
the previous events, this assumption is called Markov property.
Markov model can be represented by finite state machine where each trans-
ition between states has a fixed probability. Each state has a set of outputs
with their emission probabilities assigned. Each state produces an output
chosen from the assigned set.
Markov chain is a simplest form of Markov Model. It is a model where all
states and outputs are observable.
1.11.3 Hidden Markov Models
Hidden Markov Model is a Markov Model where state of the system are not
fully observable. It is often used for various natural language processing prob-
lems. Hidden Markov Model can represented by finite state machine very much
like Markov chain except the system state is not fully observable. Outputs
emitted by unobservable states are visible. Therefore knowing the outputs
can be used to estimate the probable sequence of states.
Hidden Markov Models have been successfully used for various natural
language processing tasks.
1.11.4 Maximum entropy principle
Entropy is a measure of the randomness of a system. Therefore a system with
maximum entropy is the one with the greatest randomness, under the given
constraints.
Model with maximum entropy under given constraints is the one that
makes the least assumptions about unknown information. Models with higher
entropy have more uniform distribution of probabilities. Because of least
amount of assumed information, model with the highest entropy is more gen-
eralizing and less biased.
Entropy of the model is measured using previously chosen boolean features.
Instead of just emitting the correct sequence of outputs the chosen model has
12
1.11. Nametag
to produce the previously selected features in the same proportions they are
present in the training data.
1.11.5 Maximum Entropy Markov Models
Maximum Entropy Markov Models are a variation on Hidden Markov Models.
There are many advantages of using Maximum Entropy Markov Models over
Hidden Markov Models. These models can use more descriptive features such
as capitalization, punctuation, part-of-speech tags, word endings and format-
ing. Richer representation of words can be used for prediction. Long distance
features can be used.
Hidden Markov Models are generative models. That means that they
generate the observable output sequence based on hidden states. In contrast
Maximum Entropy Markov Models are discriminative models. The output
sequence is given and the states are conditioned on the given output sequence.
1.11.6 Viterbi algorithm
Viterbi algorithm is a dynamic programming algorithm that is used to find
most probable path trough Markov Model given the sequence of outputs.
Viterbi algorithm became a standard way to find the most likely sequence
of states in many machine learning systems such as Hidden Markov Models,
Maximum Entropy Markov Models and Conditional random fields.
1.11.7 Nametag classifier
Classifier predicts all possible sequences of tags and positions inside of entity.
Number of classes is depends on the dataset. CoNLL2003 dataset has 4 classes.
CNEC has 42 classes and 7 supertypes.
Position of a word in an entity is described using BILOU scheme. B means
beginning of an multi-word entity, I is inside of multi-word entity, L is last
word of multi-word entity, O means outside of entity and U is unit entity - a
single word entity.
Using classes from dataset and BILOU schema classifier assigns tags such
as B-LOC, I-ORG and O to words.
1.11.8 Decoding
Probabilities estimated by Maximum Entropy classifier are decoded using dy-
namic programming. Nametag custom implementation of Viterbi algorithm
has been optimized by removing impossible BILOU scheme transitions. BILOU
scheme itself has been modified by reducing number of possible tags without
losing any information.
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1.11.9 Nametag features
Nametag uses standard set of classification features used for Named entity
recognition. The features used in Nametag are following: form, lemma, part-
of-speech tag and chunk (only in English) of current word and surrounding
words (two preceding and two following words).
One big group of features are orthographic features such as capitalization,
punctuation, lowercase and uppercase form of the word.
Nametag also uses simpler features including suffixes and prefixes of length
4 and regular expressions identifying possible year, date and time (in Czech).
The whole process of classifying and decoding runs twice (two stages) and
the output from the first stage is used as one of input features for the second
stage. The second run uses predictions for five words before and after the
current word. It also uses predictions for the same words as the current word
from previous 500 words.
Because Named entity recognition relies on external knowledge Nametag
uses gazetteers which were collected from various sources and retrieved from
Wikipedia [22]. Gazetteers from Wikipedia were created by processing the
appropriate categories such as people, births and cities.
Nametag utilizes information from Brown clusters for both Czech and
English language.
1.11.10 Gazetteers
Gazetteers are lists of words from the same category such as locations, or-
ganizations, etc. These lists of words are often used as additional data for
various Natural language processing tasks. CoNLL-2003 shared task data in-
cludes gazetteers to improve Named entity recognition results and to research
possibilities of using external data such as gazetteers for the task.
1.11.11 Brown clusters
Brown clustering algorithms group words into predefined number of clusters
based on their context. Each cluster represents one ”class” of words that has
similar contexts (eg. cities, countries, days of week, etc.). Brown clusters
can be generated using unsupervised learning algorithms therefore any unan-
notated dataset of sentences can be used for training.
1.11.12 Word embedding
Word embedding algorithms map words or phrases to vector of real numbers.
Vector distance of two given words represents similarity of their common con-
text. Word embeddings are usually generated using neural networks. Vector
representations in Word embeddings have better ability to model relationships
between words compared to classes in Brown clusters.
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1.11.13 Word2vec
Word2vec is the state of the art implementation of algorithm capable of gen-
erating word embeddings. It was developed by Thomas Mikolov et al. and
released under Apache license [1]. Word2vec uses very simple model architec-
tures compared to previous solutions [39]. Because of that it can be used on
much larger datasets 2. Nametag does not use word2vec but it is commonly
used for natural language processing tasks. [47] [35]
2The training speed is in the order of billions of words [39].
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Chapter 2
Analysis and design
2.1 Brief introduction
Phishing emails are usually targeted at a specific domain. Attackers try to
impersonate a certain company. We believe that target of the phishing email
is a valuable information that can be used for phishing email detection.
Named entity recognition recognizes entities in the text. Organization re-
cognized in the email should give us enough information to determine the
target of the phishing email. Named entity recognition has been already suc-
cessfully used to detect phishing emails. [44]
2.1.1 Nametag
We have decided to use Nametag, the state of the art Czech Named entity
recognition system implemented by Strakova´ et al. [46] We suspect that we
will need to train our own models for Nametag because Named entity recogni-
tion is a domain specific task. Nametag has models for English language that
perform similarly to other state of the art Named entity recognition solutions.
Therefore we will use Nametag for both Czech and English Named entity
recognition.
2.1.2 Phishing target detection
We will develop phishing target detection solution based on Nametag. We
plan to parse the email and send the parsed text to Nametag. Then we want
to detect the phishing target based mainly on detected organizations.
2.1.3 Phishing email detection
Finally we will develop phishing email detection solution. We plan to use
phishing target detection to generate features for the described phishing de-
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tector. The rest of the features will be picked from the most successful features
used in [48] and from the features used in [37].
We will use random forest classifier because it is a well performing simple
method. If the performance of the random forest will not be sufficient we will
use neural networks and compare those two methods.
We are going to use python [15] for development of our phishing detection
solution and majority of related tools.
2.2 Nametag
In following sections we will describe how we plan to use Nametag, challenges
we expect to face and how we want to solve those challenges.
2.3 Models for Nametag
The most important part of using Nametag are the models. Named entity
recognition is domain specific task and we can not assume that original models
are usable for phishing email detection.
We will evaluate the performance of original models available on Nametag
website. [11] We suspect that the performance of the original models will be
insufficient.
If so we will need to train our own models using custom training dataset.
It is important to make sure that the models we train ourselves have similar
performance to the original models. We will need to train the models using
original datasets if we want to be able to properly test the custom trained
models.
2.4 Parsing original dataset
In order to train Nametag models we will have to parse the original training
data. We are worried that parsing will cause performance decrease because
the CNEC dataset format is non-trivial.
There is a repository created by Strakova´ at el. [19] which can be used to
train Named entity recognition model. Using this repository may be beneficial
because we will not have to parse the CNEC dataset and configure all the
learning options and features for Named entity recognition. Therefore we
believe models trained using this repository will have similar results compared
to original models for Nametag.
On the other hand Nametag has other advantages. It is an optimized
Named entity recognition solution that is polished and ready to use. [11] It
has quite simple training format and feature selection. Also there is a brief
documentation that describes running the recognizer, training new models
and using Nametag as a REST server.
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We will try to use the repository [19] before Nametag because it should be
easier to use as is. After that we will decide which solution is better for our
purpose.
2.5 Custom training data
Training data for Named entity recognition needs to be annotated. Data is
usually annotated by human annotators. [4] This is a challenge we need to
solve.
For testing purposes we will annotate some data by hand. But annotating
huge amounts of data by hand is out of consideration and we will need to find
other ways to create training data.
2.6 Creating training data
We have access to Email.cz data which includes thousands of legitimate emails
grouped by domain. Emails are not annotated so we have to find a way to
annotate this data.
2.6.1 Regular expressions
We could use regular expressions to match name of the organization in the
email. We would need to create regular expression to match the organization
name inside of emails with same domain. It would still require lot of human
involvement because domain usually does not match the organization name
and regular expressions might be hard to generate automatically.
2.6.2 Supervised learning
We might use a method based on supervised learning to annotate the data.
This method takes advantage of the fact that Named entity recognition can
recognize entities that are not present in the training data if the context of
said entities is similar to data from the training dataset.
This method consists of iterations. In each iteration the emails grouped
by domain are annotated using existing model. The most accurately tagged
domains are determined. Emails belonging to the chosen domain are annot-
ated using tagged data. Annotated data is added to the training dataset and
model is retrained.
Some parts of the process would still require human action such as selected
domains checking and generated training data checking. But that is expected
when generating annotated data.
Essential part of this method is choosing the most accurately tagged do-
mains. To achieve this we need to develop metrics that correlate with accuracy
of the annotation. Metrics should be based on traditional evaluation metrics
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such as precision and recall. Expected organization name for group of emails
will be based on domain of said group.
2.6.3 Domain and organization name
Performance of both methods will be affected by the fact that organization
name usually does not match the domain name. This is a serious problem
that needs to be solved.
2.7 Matching organization and domain
In order to determine domain for each organization and vice versa we will use
Firmy.cz. To get legal names for organizations we plan to use data from ARES.
ARES is the information system which can be used to search economical
subjects in Czech Republic. We will get data from Firmy.cz [6] for subjects
obtained from ARES.
Firmy.cz is a catalogue website that gathers information about Czech or-
ganizations and offers interface to search in the gathered database. A web-
site owned and maintained by Seznam.cz [18], leading technology company in
Czech Republic.
Data available trough Firmy.cz contains domain of the subject if it has
any. It also often contains some additional data such as common name for the
subject.
2.8 Performance testing
We want test and evaluate the models we train in order to confirm that the
performance of the models is sufficient for our purpose.
2.8.1 CoNLL2003 shared task
There is a evaluation script available for CoNLL2003 shared task. We plan to
use it and evaluate the performance of the models we train.
2.8.2 Czech Named Entity Corpus
We did not find any evaluation script for CNEC dataset. We will try to find
a way to evaluate our models using CNEC dataset as a reference.
2.9 Target detection
The goal of target detection is to determine the most likely target of the
potential phishing email based on Named entity recognition output. We will
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need to detect the most target in order to use Named entity recognition for
phishing email detection.
We will find the organizations from the email that were recognized the
most times. Recognized organizations will be used to determine the most
likely target.
We are going to use data from Firmy.cz to map detected entities to do-
mains. We will use domains as unique identifiers for targets of the phishing
email.
2.10 Target detection performance testing
We are going to test the target detection performance of the trained models.
We have found two resources we will use to evaluate the trained models. One
of the resources is Phishtank and the second one are the emails grouped by
domain from Email.cz data.
2.10.1 Phishtank
Phishtank has a database of phishing reports. These reports include target of
the phishing attack. This can be used to create a dataset of phishing emails
with targets. We will use this dataset to estimate the performance of our
models.
2.10.2 Domain based testing
Emails grouped by domain can be also used to estimate the performance of
the trained models. We are going to use domain name as a reference. We
will use data from Firmy.cz to determine domains based on entities recog-
nized by NER. We will use evaluate the performance of our trained models by
comparing determined domains with reference.
2.11 Using NER for phishing detection
In this section we will briefly describe how we are going to use Named entity
recognition for phishing email detection. First we plan to use NER to detect
organizations present in the phishing email. As next step we want to determine
most likely targets of the phishing email using detected organizations. The
most likely targets will be used to generate features for the phishing detector
itself.
We have a dataset of legitimate emails sent by many organizations gathered
by Email.cz at our disposal. The legitimate emails from organizations and
websites include many types of emails such as newsletters, special offers, emails
with activation hypertext links, service updates, security notices and notific-
ations. The emails are grouped by organization. We plan to train models on
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these legitimate emails. We want to use the trained models to recognize any
emails that look like they are sent by given organization but are not similar
to legitimate emails regularly sent by given organization.
We plan to extract more data from the emails using Named entity recog-
nition in order to improve phishing detector performance.
2.12 Phishing email detector
Before using Named entity recognition for phishing email detection we have to
develop a baseline solution without features based on target detection. Once
we develop a phishing email detection solution we will evaluate the perform-
ance of the detector without features generated by Named entity recognition.
Then we are going to add the features we generated using Named entity re-
cognition.
We will use random forest classifier implementation from scikit-learn [40]
[17] python library for development of our phishing email detection solution.
We are going to use both phishing and non-phishing emails from Email.cz
data 1.5.2 to evaluate the performance of our solution.
Features we are planning to use are described in following sections.
2.13 Common features
We have chosen a number of features for our baseline solution. We plan to
use the most successful features according to [48] listed earlier 1.9 along with
chosen features used in [37]. Features should detect some kind of suspicious
characteristics that could mean that email is phishing.
2.13.1 Link-based features
Phishing emails almost always contain link leading to the pishing website.
Therefore many features we are going to use represent some kind of informa-
tion about links in the email.
Some features will be based on simple metrics such as max number of
periods in the URL or total number of links in the email. Other features are
going to be more sophisticated. One example of the later is a number of links
that are not similar to majority of the links in the email.
2.13.2 Other suspicious characteristics
Links are not only thing that is characteristic for phishing emails. Anything
that is common for phishing emails can be used as a feature. We plan to use
features based on such suspicious characteristics. Some examples include the
presence of HTML form tag or the presence of the HTML itself.
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2.13.3 General features
Features that represent general characteristics of the email can provide a lot of
information for phishing email detection. Because of that we will use features
such as word count, body richness and subject richness.
2.14 Target detection features
We will generate features using the data from target detection. This section is
describing basic types of features we plan to generate and use for the phishing
email detection.
2.14.1 Simple target based features
Simple features that are easy to implement can still provide valuable informa-
tion about the email. That is the reason why we are going to create a boolean
feature that is true when any target was detected and false when there was
no target detected.
2.14.2 Specific target features
Target detection gives us a lot of information. We want to use all the inform-
ation obtained using target detection to detect phishing emails.
Therefore we will generate a features including information about specific
target or targets that were detected from the email.
2.14.3 Suspicious links features
Links are important part of phishing emails. Because of that we are going to
create a features that will detect suspicious links in the email. This feature
will be based on the detected target and historical data about links used by
the detected target.
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Chapter 3
Realization
3.1 Named entity recognition
In following sections we are going to describe the process of using Named entity
recognition for phishing target detection. We will focus on challenges and
problems we had to solve in order to develop target detection that improves
the performance of our baseline phishing email detection.
3.2 Nametag models
First challenge we faced was to obtain models that would be fit for our task.
In this section we are going to describe how we determined the fitness of the
existing models. We are also going to look at the process of training our own
models and related challenges.
3.2.1 Original models
Nametag was released with models for Czech and English languages trained
using CNEC and CoNLL2003 datasets respectively. We have suspected that it
will be necessary to train custom models for Nametag because Named entity
recognition is a domain-specific task and solutions trained on certain data
won’t perform adequately on data that is very different such as emails. [43]
We have used various emails from Email.cz as a testing data. While ob-
serving the output of the Nametag we have noticed that many organizations
were not being recognized. After that we examined the training data and
found out that majority of the organization we needed to detect was not
present in the training data. We have confirmed that performance of the
original models is insufficient for our purpose because of domain specificity.
We assumed that the biggest problem with original models was that many
organizations were not present in the training data. Probably the second prob-
lem with the original data was that structure and language are a lot different
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compared to typical email. The perfect solution for both problems would
be creating a large custom dataset mainly using data extracted from emails.
Problem with this approach is that creating the dataset is time consuming
because the training data has to be annotated.
We have decided to use the original datasets as a core of our dataset and
extend it by adding custom training data extracted from emails.
3.3 Training models using original data
We wanted to make sure that we are able to train models with similar per-
formance as original models trained by Strakova´ et al.
In order to compare the models properly we have used repository [19]
created by Strakova´ et al. because it has all the tools necessary for parsing
the data and training Named entity recognition models. Which makes it easier
to replicate the training process and match the results stated in [46].
First we downloaded all the necessary data such as CoNLL2003 data-
set, unannotated data, brown clusters and gazetteers. Then we generated
word2vec [23] word embeddings 3. Finally we trained the Named entity recog-
nition models 4. Performance of the models was evaluated using tools available
in the repository and the results were comparable to results from [46].
We have achieved to train models that match the performance claimed
in the Nametag paper [46]. Table 3.1 shows results for . However we have
faced several problems when using [19] repository. One of the problems was
slow training speed. Next problem was the huge amount of RAM required
for training. Another problem was complex training data format that would
complicate adding custom data to the dataset. Also the repository is a quite
complicated collection of scripts with a few hardcoded paths which makes it
difficult to use.
Figure 3.1: Performance of our model trained using [19] repository 5
All entities (p/r/f) Oneword (p/r/f) Twoword (p/r/f)
Type: 74.71 / 80.95 / 77.71 79.36 / 82.68 / 80.99 79.63 / 81.13 / 80.37
Suptype: 78.37 / 84.89 / 81.50 83.97 / 87.45 / 85.68 81.35 / 82.88 / 82.11
3Generating word2vec took over 24 hours
4Training models took over 72 hours and required about 300GB of RAM.
5Table shows performance for one word, two word and all entities. ”p/r/f” stands for
precision/recall/f-measure. Type and Suptype stands for entity types and supertypes as
described in section 1.10.2.
26
3.4. Training models for Nametag
3.4 Training models for Nametag
Because of various problems we encountered while using [19] repository we
have focused on Nametag. It can be used as an executable, a library or a
REST server. The format of the training data is simple. And recognizer has
two different output formats. [11]
The reason we used [19] repository before Nametag is that Nametag has a
lot of configurable options for training models and we have not found parser
to parse CNEC and CoNLL2003 training data format usable with Nametag.
We originally wanted to reproduce the training process as closely as possible.
We have suspected that using custom parser and custom configuration for
training Nametag models would significantly reduce the performance of the
trained models.
3.4.1 Parsing the training data
We have created a custom parser for CNEC plain text training data format.
CNEC is available in plain text, XML, HTML and treex formats. We have
chose the plain text format because we wanted to make it easier to add training
data in the future. We also parsed the CoNLL2003 training dataset.
3.4.1.1 Training configuration
We used recommended training configuration [11] for Nametag training. We
have trained Nametag models for Czech and English using parsed CNEC and
CoNLL2003 training data respectively.
Figure 3.2: Performance of our model trained using Nametag 6
Precision Recall F-measure
All: 86.08 % 77.25 % 81.43 %
LOC: 91.05 % 74.20 % 81.76 %
MISC: 89.34 % 69.96 % 78.47 %
ORG: 75.40 % 77.48 % 76.43 %
PER: 89.09 % 83.77 % 86.35 %
3.4.2 Testing
We have used an official testing script [12] for CoNLL2003 shared task to
evaluate the performance of the trained models. The results of model trained
using CoNLL2003 dataset are in the 3.2. Models we trained ourselves achieved
82 F-measure on CoNLL2003 shared task. According to [46] original models
6First line shows total score of the model. Other lines show score for individual entity
types.
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achieved 89 F-measure. We consider performance of the models we trained
suitable for our purpose.
3.4.3 Nametag training data format
Nametag training format is quite simple. It consists of two columns where
the first column is the word and the second column is tag for the word with
simplified BILOU scheme prefix 1.11.7. That is why we had no trouble adding
more data to parsed CNEC and CoNLL2003 datasets. Adding custom data
has proven to be extremely important as we found out later when performing
tests.
3.5 Phishing target detection
We have found out that we are able to train models that achieve sufficient
performance in general Named entity recognition task. Next task was to
detect the most likely target from the emails using Named entity recognition.
Input file is in EML format [16]. Desired output is the list of the most likely
targets of the potential phishing email. We have developed a python script
which is described in the next section.
3.5.1 Implementation
At first we parse the EML file using closed source szn-lib-mime library 7. We
use all HTML and plain text parts of the email. From headers we extract
subject and the from field. We process the from field and use following in-
formation: email address, name, domain and local-part of the email address.
All parsed text is passed to next part of the script.
We use guess language python module [7] to detect the language of the
email. Language detection can be overridden be passing language option to
the script.
Based on guessed language or the language specified by user we choose the
Nametag model that will be used for Named entity recognition. For English
language we use model based on CoNLL2003 training data and for all other
languages we use model based on CNEC training data. Our primary focus
are emails in Czech language and Nametag was developed as a Czech Named
entity recognition. That is why we decided to default to Czech model in cases
when guess language module fails to detect the language or when there is
insufficient data for accurate language detection.
We use Nametag REST server to recognize the entities in the text. Ori-
ginally we used Nametag executable instead of REST server. Before actual
Named entity recognition Nametag loads the models into the memory which
7A library used to parse EML files in Email.cz
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takes a long time compared to actual recognition 8. Nametag REST server
can stay running in the background and the models don’t have to be loaded
for every email which speeds up the recognition significantly.
After Nametag REST server returns recognized named entities output pro-
cessing takes place. First we count the occurrences of each detected entity in
the text. All words are lowercased before counting. After that we filter out
entities that are not organizations. Then we get number of occurrences for
every detected organization and sort all detected organization by the occur-
rence count. We have tested multiple different ways to process the Nametag
output and this one gives the best results.
In order to simplify the future integration of the phishing target detection
into the phishing detection solution we have created python module that can
be easily used in any python script.
3.5.2 Testing using Phishtank
After developing phishing target detection solution we needed to estimate the
accuracy of the prediction. We have decided to use data from Phishtank [14].
Phishing reports from Phishtank include malicious link used for phishing.
Reports also usually include the phishing target of the attack.
We have used dataset of emails from Email.cz and picked the emails with
existing Phishtank report. Then we have filtered out all the reports that did
not have valid phishing target. Targets we removed included ”Other”, strings
full of numbers and empty strings.
Because many reports were tagged by invalid phishing target the resulting
dataset consisted of 58 emails with valid phishing targets.
We do not think that the results of the test should be taken very seriously
because of the small amount of testing samples. But despite the small dataset
we can still get general idea about performance and accuracy of the phishing
target detection of our solution.
Next reason why we performed the tests was to compare see the difference
between the models trained using original data and the models trained using
custom and original datasets.
The models trained using original CoNLL2003 training data have predicted
the phishing target correctly in 29 %of the cases.
We have taken some phishing emails from dataset available at Email.cz.
The chosen emails have been annotated by hand and added to the training
data. We have trained new models using CoNLL2003 dataset extended by
new data from emails.
The new models trained using the extended dataset have predicted the
phishing target correctly in the 58 % of the cases.
8Loading models takes a few seconds. The recognition itself takes under 0.01 seconds.
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We have observed the testing data and the results of all performed tests.
We have found out that before adding more more training data the main
problem was that the Named entity recognition did not recognize the entities.
This changed after adding more training data to the dataset. Majority of
the emails where target detection failed were either heavily obfuscated or the
phishing target was not mentioned at all. This is something that concerns us
because real world data can also have no target or can be obfuscated.
The performance is not ideal but it is sufficient for our usage. Because our
solution will not be based entirely on the phishing target detection. We will
use phishing target detection as one of the features for our phishing detection
solution.
During the testing we have found out that Nametag is capable of recog-
nizing entities that are not present in the training data.
3.5.3 Czech language
Unfortunately to our knowledge there is no database similar to Phistank for
Czech language. Therefore we could not test Czech model using similar ap-
proach.
We wanted to find a way to test the target detection performance of the
Czech models.
3.5.4 Email.cz data
We have access to the Email.cz dataset that includes legitimate emails sent by
many organizations. These emails include many types of emails such as news-
letters, special offers, emails with activation hypertext links, service updates,
security notices and notifications. The emails are grouped by domain.
We have decided to use this data to test performance of the Czech models.
In order to be able to use emails grouped by domains as reference we had to
develop a solution that maps detected organizations to domains.
3.6 Organization to domain mapping
We gathered data about large number of organizations and obtained domains
for those organizations. Then we have developed a solution that maps organ-
ization names to domains.
References to organizations in the emails are not usually done using their
legal name. To solve this problems we used alternative names for the or-
ganizations. And we have developed a set of rules to generate mappings for
organizations to match the organizations names effectively.
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3.6.1 Data gathering
First we have downloaded a list of about 183 thousand organizations from [5].
We have extracted the legal names of the organizations. Organizations that
were marked as defunct were deleted. Quotation marks were removed from
organization names.
Next we have used Firmy.cz [6] data to get domains and common names
for each organization. Sample of the data we have created is in the figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Sample of data from Firmy.cz9
{"title_use_alternative": false, "title_addition": ", s.r.o.",
"title": "ALWAID", "subject_id": 2166604,
"_ORGANIZATION": "ALWAID s.r.o.", "_HAS_URL": true,
"title_alternative": "", "_FOUND": true, "id": 647044,
"url_visible": "http://www.zachoval.cz"}
{"_ORGANIZATION": "ALZABRADLI s.r.o.", "_FOUND": false,
"_HAS_URL": false}
{"title_use_alternative": true, "title_addition": ", a.s.",
"title": "Alza.cz", "subject_id": 2121578,
"_ORGANIZATION": "Alza.cz a.s.", "_HAS_URL": true,
"title_alternative": "Alza.cz", "_FOUND": true,
"id": 12847874, "url_visible": "http://www.alza.cz"}
{"_ORGANIZATION": "Al-Zain Group s.r.o.", "_FOUND": false,
"_HAS_URL": false}
3.6.2 Implementation
We have developed a python script that uses this data 3.3 to map organizations
to domains.
First the data about organizations is loaded. Organizations without spe-
cified domain are ignored. For each domain following process is used to create
mappings.
All names and titles are extracted from the loaded JSON record. Extracted
names and the domain are used to generate a set of possible alternative names
using replacement and removal rules. Predefined groups of interchangeable
strings, removable strings and removable characters are used to generate a
large number of organization name alternatives. Names are added to the set
and used as mappings for given domain.
9Data format is JSON record on separate line for each organization. Empty lines in this
figure were added for readability.
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Sample from the resulting set is in the figure 3.4. Some domains have
multiple organizations associated with them which increases the size of the
generated set.
3.6.3 English mappings
Mappings for 18 major international technology and financial organizations
were added manually. The main focus of this thesis is Czech phishing email
detection. Therefore this is sufficient number of english organizations.
Figure 3.4: Sample of domain mappings10
alpine pro , a.s. alpine pro
alpine pro, a.s. alpine pro morava s . r . o .
alpine pro stores,s.r.o. alpine pro,a.s.
alpine pro stores,s.r.o alpine pro stores, s.r.o
alpine pro stores , s.r.o. alpine pro stores, s.r.o
alpinepro.cz alpine pro stores, s r . o
3.7 Extending Nametag training data
It was necessary to extend the dataset because many organizations were not
being recognized when using models trained with original data. We have
already added some international organizations manually. But we could not
do this for Czech organizations because of the huge amount of various organ-
izations we want to detect.
3.7.1 Adding unstructured data
We have have added a few organizations to the dataset in the form of unstruc-
tured data without sentences. We have observed a very little performance
decrease in general Named entity recognition task. However the performance
of the recognition significantly improved for the entities we added to the data-
set. We saw that we can add entities to the data without having to annotate
sentences.
3.7.2 Large amounts of added data
Because we wanted to recognize a huge number of organizations we have added
all 183 thousand entities from [5] to the dataset. Created training dataset was
over 10 times the size of the original one. Performance of the recognition
decreased drastically because of low quality of the added data.
10This is a selected sample from the set generated for ”alpinepro.cz” domain. Original
size was 43 entries.
32
3.8. Testing domain detection
Many organization have long names that contain addresses, names or re-
petitive generic words. Such words, addresses and names were often misclas-
sified as organizations during testing. Low quality of the data also caused a
lot of errors in chunking which drastically affected overall performance of the
system.
3.7.3 Choosing data for the dataset
We needed to minimize the errors caused by adding large amounts of low
quality data. We have used a set of most frequent targets of the phishing
attacks obtained from Email.cz. Names for the targeted domains were de-
termined using data from Firmy.cz 3.3. Resulting 876 organization names
were added to the dataset. Amount of recognized entities was significantly
increased for the targets that were added to the dataset. We have noticed
a small amount of chunking errors. Misclassifications caused by added data
were almost nonexistent.
3.7.4 English dataset
Unfortunately data from Firmy.cz does not include English entities and their
domains. Because of that we could not have used the same approach. We
have manually annotated and added a few dozens of hand picked emails to
the English dataset.
3.8 Testing domain detection
We have extended original Nametag datasets and trained new models. We
have also developed solution for mapping organizations to domains.
Next thing we did was testing and evaluation of the performance of our
target domain detection solution. In the following sections we will describe
the process and the results of the testing.
The data used for testing comes from Email.cz dataset. The emails we used
were grouped by domain. We have taken 30 emails for each of 876 domains
and used our domain detection solution. Detected domains were compared
with reference domains. We have calculated the detection accuracy for each
domain.
We have evaluated the performance of the models we trained. Performance
of the models trained using extended dataset was compared to the performance
of the model trained only with original datasets.
The graph 3.5 shows the accuracy of the detection for each of used domains.
The area under the graph represents total accuracy of the domain detection
solution. Domains on the left were detected correctly 100 % or the times.
Domains on the right were not detected at all.
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Figure 3.5: Target detection accuracy11
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3.8.1 Results
Total accuracy of the original model is 18 %. Total accuracy of the extended
model is 24 %. We can see that the extended model caused a significant
performance increase in domain detection. However 24% accuracy cannot be
generally considered a good result.
In order to make conclusions about performance of our domain detection
solution we have to look at the distribution of the domains within the graph.
This is important because we need to detect the domains that are common
targets of the phishing attacks. Also it is not a problem if we cannot detect
domains that are never attacked.
Figure 3.6 shows us a three samples from the distribution of the domains.
We can see that sample of the most detected domains contains a lot of financial
institutions. In contrast the sample of domains that were not detected at all
contains mostly unknown domains or domains that are unlikely targets of the
phishing attacks.
We examined the emails from the dataset and we have found out that
some emails do not contain any mention of the targeted organization. This
naturally lowers the performance achievable in this test.
11Graph shows accuracy of detection for each domain.
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Another thing that makes the domain detection hard is the number of
domains we are trying to detect.
Because of observation we made we consider our domain target solution
sufficient for our purposes. We have proved that it is possible to improve
domain detection performance by training better named entity recognized
models.
Figure 3.6: Target detection samples12
80 % and more around 55 % 0 %
airbank.cz praha9.cz alza.cz
erasvet.cz totalbrokers.cz arcelormittal.com
itesco.cz berpujcku.cz babynabytek.cz
realmoney.cz ceskapojistovna.cz boschrexroth.cz
aaaauto.cz cez.cz canariatravel.cz
ebay.com dracik.cz c-budejovice.cz
ifortuna.cz eufrat.cz cement.cz
zasilkovna.cz homecredit.cz ceskyserver.cz
tchibo.cz paypal.com coleman.cz
victoriatip.cz pns.cz e-rezervace.cz
gigaserver.cz jtbank.cz fler.cz
royalvision.cz sberbankcz.cz mendelu.cz
slavia-pojistovna.cz agrofert.cz mora.cz
equabank.cz hyundai.cz o2.cz
vodafone.cz lr-czech.com pokrok.cz
bohemiacargo.cz okgroup.cz prvni-lekarna.cz
armexenergy.cz uvt.cz sam73.cz
europ-assistance.cz ascari.cz sipkova.cz
kbps.cz axa.cz spcr.cz
reprofit.cz mall.cz vzp.cz
3.9 Phishing email detection
We have successfully developed a targeted domain detection solution. Next
thing we had to do was developing a phishing detection solution that would
allow us to evaluate the performance of the features based on the detected
target.
12We have randomly selected the same amount of domains for each column. Then we
have picked the most interesting domains from each selected sample.
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3.9.1 Baseline solution
We have implemented a baseline phishing email detection solution using py-
thon [15]. We have used random forest classifier implementation from the
scikit-learn library. [17] The classifier was configured to use 10 decision trees
in the random forest.
For the baseline solution we chose 26 features. Features we used include
all features listed in the features section 1.9. Some of the used features were
taken from [37].
3.9.2 Testing baseline solution
We have split the Email.cz dataset and used 20 % of the data for testing.
Accuracy achieved by the baseline solution using all available features was
97.6.
We have performed more tests using only one feature at the time. The
three features with highest accuracy were number of phishing keywords, max-
imum number of periods in the URL and body richness.
Number of phishing keywords achieved 82.2 accuracy. Phishing keywords
are predefined words that are characteristic for phishing emails.
Maximum number of periods in URL achieved 81.2 accuracy. It is interest-
ing that such a simple feature can be so helpful for phishing email detection.
Body richness achieved 80.5 accuracy. This feature is defined in state of
the art of this thesis 1.9.1 section.
3.10 Final solution
Final solution was created by incorporating target based features into the
baseline solution. Target detection solution outputs an array of detected do-
mains for each email. Each domain in the array has an assigned probability
that represents the likelihood of the domain being a target of the email.
Probability is determined by counting all entities in the email that can
be mapped to the domain. Then the counts are normalized for all domains
returned in the array so that the sum of all probabilities equals to 100 %.
3.10.1 Target based features
Output from target detection was used to generate following features.
Domain detected feature is a boolean feature that is true if any domain
was detected.
Top 1 detected domain feature which includes two values. First value is
an id of the most probable detected domain. The second value is percentage
that the domain is the target.
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Top 5 detected domains feature that is much like the top 1 feature. Except
it includes percentages and id’s for top 5 detected domains.
Last feature we have generated was boolean feature that detects mis-
matched links. Link is considered mismatched if it leads to domains that are
not usually present in the emails sent by this specific target. Commonly linked
domains are determined using historically collected data by Email.cz. We have
implemented aggressive and benevolent versions for this feature. Both of these
versions achieved similar performance and we will not differentiate between
them from now on.
3.10.2 Testing final solution
We have used the same testing data for both final solution and baseline solu-
tion testing. Accuracy achieved by the final solution using all available fea-
tures was 98. Which is a minor improvement over baseline solution with 97.7
accuracy.
We have performed more tests using only one feature at the time. All
three features with the highest accuracy were based on target detection.
The three top features were: boolean domain detected feature, percentage
for top 1 detected domain and link mismatch feature.
All three features achieved similar accuracy of 86.9. Compared to 82.2
accuracy for best feature from baseline solution.
3.10.3 Results
Testing showed us that target based features can improve the performance of
the phishing emails detection. We have found out that target based features
provide a significant amount of information about an email. Target based
features outperform the commonly used features for phishing email detection.
3.10.4 Possible improvements
This thesis proves that Named entity recognition can be used for Czech phish-
ing email detection. However there is a lot of ways to improve the current
solution.
More data for Named entity recognition may be created. New better
Nametag models could be trained using created data. This should improve to
domain specific performance of the model.
Mapping is currently done using keyword and dictionary based approach.
This is not ideal because it depends on predefined data. More methods for
creating mappings should be researched.
Bigger phishing email dataset should be gathered to reduce the bias of
the dataset. Observations made in this thesis should be confirmed by testing
using live traffic.
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Conclusion
We have researched the state of the art phishing email detection methods and
the common methods of machine learning performance evaluation. We have
researched the state of the art Czech Named entity recognition system and
the possibilities of using it to detect phishing attacks.
We have analyzed Nametag, the state of the art Czech Named entity re-
cognition system. We managed to train models that match the performance of
the original models [46]. Models for Nametag were trained using original data-
sets. The performance of the models was insufficient for our purpose because
emails differ from structure of the original training data. Domain specific per-
formance have been improved by adding custom data to the original datasets.
We have developed a solution that can predict the targeted organization
of the phishing attack based on the Nametag output. We have used data from
Phishtank [14] to test the accuracy of our solution. Models used for testing
were trained using both original dataset and improved extended dataset.
We have downloaded the list of the Czech subjects from ARES [5]. Firmy.cz
[6], the catalogue of Czech organizations, was used to get matching domains
for downloaded subjects. We have developed a solution that maps recognized
entities to domains using data from ARES and Firmy.cz. Mappings for sev-
eral important international banking and technology companies were added
manually. Czech dataset was extended using generated mappings and list of
most attacked domains from Email.cz. We have used legitimate emails from
Email.cz dataset grouped by domain to evaluate performance of the solution.
Results of the testing showed the performance increase achieved by using the
extended models.
We have developed a baseline phishing email detector using random forest
classifier. Features used for baseline solution were based on research of both
English and Czech phishing detection solutions. The performance of the
baseline solution was measured.
Phishing target detection solution and domain mappings were used to
generate features for phishing email detection. Generated features were added
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to the baseline solution and the performance was evaluated. Target based
features caused a minor improvement in the total accuracy of the phishing
detection solution. Accuracy achieved by the final solution with target based
features was 98 compared to 97.7 accuracy achieved by baseline solution.
We have performed tests using only one feature at the time to discover
the most significant features for phishing email detection. The target based
features achieved the best accuracy out of all used features. The top three
most significant features were all based on target detection. These features
achieve 86.9 accuracy when used as one feature at the time. For comparison
the best feature from the baseline solution scored 82.2 accuracy.
These results suggest that target based features are powerful features for
phishing email detection. Target based features improve the overall perform-
ance of the phishing email detection solution. We are convinced that target
based features are effective way to detect phishing emails.
More fine-tuning of the solution is a subject for future work. Further
improvements may be achieved by improving various parts of the process such
as Named entity recognition, target detection and domain mapping. Phishing
email detection solution itself could be improved by adding more target-based
features or trying different machine learning methods. Observations made in
this thesis should be confirmed by testing using bigger dataset or live traffic.
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Appendix A
Acronyms
API Application Programming Interface
ARES Administrativn´ı registr ekonomicky´ch subjekt˚u (Administrational re-
gistry of economical subjects)
CNEC Czech Named Entity Corpus
CoNLL Conference on Computational Natural Language Learning
EML Elecronic Mail
JSON JavaScript Object Notation
MEMM Maximum Entropy Markov Models
ML Machine Learning
MUC Message Understanding Conference
NER Named Entity Recognition
NLP Natural Language Processing
HMM Hidden Markov Models
RAM Random Access Memory
REST Representational State Transfer
RFC Request for comments
URL Uniform Resource Locator
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Appendix B
Contents of enclosed SD card
data..............................................the directory of data
feature data......... the directory of extracted features for training
organizations data ............. the directory of organizations data
Makefile......Makefile for running selected parts of the implementation
readme.md....................the file with SD card contents description
results.......................the directory with results of the training
src.......................................the directory of source codes
code........................................implementation sources
addTargetFeatures.py .... script for adding target based features
train.py...........script for training the phishing email detector
more...............................more implementation sources
thesis..............the directory of LATEX source codes of the thesis
text..........................................the thesis text directory
thesis.pdf...........................the thesis text in PDF format
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